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ABSTRACT
Earning management has become a common phenomenon that occurs within a company
and is difficult to avoid. Earnings management can be done because managers must obey
the certain rules. This happens in the banking industry because the banking industry has
more stringent regulations than other industries. This study aimed to examine the effect
of corporate governance on earnings management with investment opportunity set as
intervening variable. Dependent variable of this research was earnings management.
The independent variable of this study was corporate governance mechanism which was
proxy with the proportion of independent commissioners. The intervening variable of
this study was investment opportunity set. The samples of this study were banking com-
panies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2012-2015. The analytical method
used was path analysis. The results of this study indicated that corporate governance
could reduce the occurrence of earnings management practices. Meanwhile, corporate
governance did not affect the investment opportunity set and investment opportunity set
did not influence the earnings management so that investment opportunity set could not
mediate the influence of corporate governance on earnings management.
ABSTRAK
Manajemen laba sendiri telah menjadi suatu fenomena umum yang terjadi di dalam suatu
perusahaan dan sukar untuk dihindari. Manajemen laba ini bisa dilakukan karena manajer harus
menaati suatu aturan tertentu. Hal ini terjadi dalam industri perbankan karena industri perbankan
ini mempunyai regulasi yang lebih ketat dibandingkan dengan industri lain. Penelitian ini
bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh corporate governance terhadap manajemen laba dengan set
kesempatan investasi sebagai variabel intervening. Variabel dependen penelitian ini adalah
manajemen laba. Variabel independen penelitian ini adalah mekanisme corporate governance
yang diproksikan dengan tingkat proporsi komisaris independen. Variabel intervening penelitian
ini adalah set kesempatan investasi. Sampel penelitian ini adalah perusahaan perbankan yang
terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) pada tahun 2012-2015. Metode analisis yang digunakan
adalah analisis jalur. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa corporate governance dapat
mengurangi terjadinya praktek manajemen laba. Sementara itu, corporate governance ternyata
tidak berpengaruh terhadap set kesempatan investasi dan set kesempatan investasi juga tidak
berpengaruh terhadap manajemen laba sehingga set kesempatan investasi tidak bisa memediasi
pengaruh corporate governance terhadap manajemen laba.
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Managers in practice can choose the accounting
policy in accordance with the desired goals. Man-
agers may choose accounting policies that may
report higher or lower profits according to their
intended purpose. According to Scott (2009), this
action is called earnings management.
According to agency theory, earnings man-
agement arises as the impact of agency problems
namely the misalignment of interest between the
owner (principal) and the manager (agent)
(Beneish, 2001). As an agent, manager is morally
responsible to maximize the profit of the owner
(principal), but the manager also has an interest to
maximize their welfare. This is most likely caus-
ing agent does not always act in the best interests
of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Earning management has become a common
phenomenon that occurs within a company and is
difficult to avoid. Earnings management can be
done because managers must obey the certain
rules. This happens in the banking industry be-
cause the banking industry has more stringent
regulations than other industries, for example, a
bank must meet the minimum CAR (Capital Ad-
equacy Ratio) criteria. Bank Indonesia uses the fi-
nancial statements as the basis in assessing the sta-
tus of a bank to see whether the bank is a healthy
bank or not (Wahyono et al., 2013).
Financial manipulation done by improper
earnings management must be minimized to avoid
the collapse of the company. Earnings management
practices can be minimized with good corporate
governance practices (Chen et al., 2007; Kim &
Yoon, 2008). According to Djanegara (2008) cor-
porate governance is as a system and set of rules
that govern the relationship between the various
stakeholders.
Corporate governance is the mechanism de-
veloped in order to improve the company's per-
formance and management behavior. One form of
corporate governance mechanism is the presence
of independent commissioners. One of the main
functions of independent commissioners is to run
a monitoring function that is independent to the
performance of the company's management.
Researches done by Chen et al. (2007) and
Kim & Yoon (2008) indicate that an independent
commissioner can reduce the likelihood of earn-
ings management. However, researches done by
Abed et al. (2012), Chekili (2012), Chan et al., (2013)
and Yushita et al. (2013) indicate that an indepen-
dent commissioner increases the likelihood of
earnings management. In addition, the research
results of Restuningdiah (2011) and Sukeecheep et
al. (2013) indicate that independent commission-
ers do not affect earnings management.
Research on the factors affecting earnings
management is interesting to be done because this
earnings management practice can make big and
famous companies in the world and in Indonesia
collapse. In addition, the inconsistency of previ-
ous research results makes this research interest-
ing to do.
Differences in this study suspected because
of the other variables that can mediate the rela-
tionship of corporate governance and earnings
management. This study will also examine
whether investment opportunity set (IOS) is able
to mediate the relationship between corporate
governance and earnings management. IOS is an
investment decision in the combination form be-
tween owned assets (assets in place) and invest-
ment choice (growth options) in the future with
net present value (NPV) (Myers, 1977). The invest-
ment-based IOS proxy shows high level of corpo-
rate investment activity affecting company invest-
ment opportunities (Laksito & Sutapa, 2011).
Several previous studies have shown that
earnings management can be affected by IOS
(Siahaan, 2013; Mosaee & Pakzad, 2014). IOS itself
is also influenced by corporate governance
(Belghtiar & Khan, 2013; Jannati et al., 2014). The
existence of an independent board within the com-
pany is an important factor in the company growth
that is proxy through IOS.
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The purpose of this study was to examine
the effect of independent commissioners in cor-
porate governance mechanisms on earnings man-
agement, to examine the effect of independent com-
missioners on corporate governance mechanisms
on investment opportunity set, to examine the ef-
fect of investment opportunity set on earnings
management, and to examine the effect of inde-
pendent commissioners on corporate governance
mechanisms to earnings management through in-
vestment opportunity set.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Corporate Governance and Earnings
Management
Corporate governance is a matter of control-
ling the top executive behavior of the company to
protect the interests of company owners (share-
holders). It means that good corporate governance
can better align the interests of various parties. In
addition, companies that implement corporate
governance practices well should show all the rel-
evant information to stakeholders, thereby reduc-
ing the information asymmetry (Veronica &
Bachtiar, 2005).
From the above explanation it can be con-
cluded that good corporate governance can align
the interests of principal and agent and reduce the
information asymmetry. Earnings management
itself occurs due to an interest conflict and infor-
mation asymmetry. It means that good corporate
governance can suppress earnings management.
One of the corporate governance mecha-
nisms proven to reduce the occurrence of earn-
ings management practices is independent com-
missioner. One of the main functions of the inde-
pendent commissioner is to run a monitoring func-
tion that is independent to the company's man-
agement performance.
Researches done by Chen et al. (2007) and
Kim & Yoon's (2008) show that independent com-
missioner can reduce the likelihood of earnings
management. Researches done by Abed et al.
(2012), Chekili (2012), Chan et al. (2013) and Yushita
et al. (2013) state that independent commissioner
can increase the likelihood of earnings manage-
ment. Based on the explanation above, the pro-
posed hypothesis is:
H
1
: independent commissioner in corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms affects earnings man-
agement
Corporate Governance and Investment
Opportunity Set
Independent commissioner is in charge of
running the monitoring functions independently
on management performance. It is done to reduce
agency issues that can occur between owners and
management. The existence of independent com-
missioner is to balance the power of management
in corporate management through monitoring
function.
Jannati et al. (2014) states that independent
commissioner is an important factor in the growth
of companies where the company's growth rate
can be measured through IOS. Meanwhile,
Belghitar & Khan (2013) state that independent
councils have a more effective role in firms with
high investment growth rates than in firms with
low investment growth rates.
Based on agency theory, companies with a
high proportion of independent commissioners will
always think about shareholders' welfare. There-
fore, independent commissioners prefer corporate
investment policies that maximize shareholder
wealth. In addition, firms with a high proportion
of independent commissioners are less likely to
make a lot of investment. This is because if the
company invests, then the company will use a lot
of funds (including using corporate profits) to fi-
nance its investment. As a result, shareholders do
not get a share of the profits from the company
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | PERBANKAN
Vol. 21, No. 2, April 2017: 321– 330
|324 |
because the company's funds are used for invest-
ment. In this case, the higher the proportion of
independent commissioners is, the lower the IOS
(Hsu et al., 2009) is. On that basis, the proposed
hypothesis is:
H
2
: independent commissioners in corporate
governance mechanisms affect IOS
Investment Opportunity Set and Profit
Management
Agency relationship, principal (company
owner) does not have enough information about
agent performance (manager). Managers have
more information about self capacity, work envi-
ronment, and company as a whole. Managers
know well about the prospects of the company in
the future because managers have more and more
accurate information about the company's condi-
tion while shareholders have less information and
also cannot supervise the manager's work more
optimally.
Companies with high IOS contain high in-
formation asymmetries among managers and
shareholders (Shanti & Yudhanti, 2007). Manag-
ers have information about the project value in the
future and their actions cannot be supervised op-
timally by shareholders. The absence of optimal
supervision from shareholders will increase the
likelihood of earnings management. This is in ac-
cordance with the research results of Mosaee &
Pakzad (2014) that conclude the existence of IOS
encourages the occurrence of earnings manage-
ment.
Siahaan's research (2013) proves that high IOS
will improve the quality of earnings. High earn-
ings quality indicates the low probability of earn-
ings management. Companies with high IOS will
be closely monitored by auditors, so it reduces the
likelihood of managers make earnings manage-
ment. On that basis, the proposed hypothesis is:
H
3
: investment opportunity set affects the earn-
ings management
Corporate Governance, Investment
Opportunity Set, and Earnings Management
Independent commissioner duty is to moni-
tor the manager performance so that managers
work on behalf of the company owner. This can
simultaneously reduce agency issues between
owners and managers.
According to agency theory, an independent
commissioner will think of the welfare of share-
holders by choosing a low investment policy in
order for the company to have a lot of funds that
can be shared with shareholders.
A low level of investment means that the
company's projects are also few. This means that
the level of company information asymmetry is
low and the likelihood of earnings management is
also small. However, low investment can also mean
that auditors' supervision becomes looser and in-
creases the likelihood of earnings management. On
that basis, the proposed hypothesis is:
H
4
: independent commissioners have an influence
on profit management through investment
opportunity set
METHOD
The population used in this study was all
banking companies listed in Indonesia Stock Ex-
change in the period of 2012-2015. The samples
used were 104 banking companies.
The definition of operational variables and
their measurements can be seen in Table 1. This
study examined the direct and indirect effects of
variables by using path analysis. The research
model of path analysis can be seen in Figure 1.
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P Y1 x 1
 
P Y2 x 1      P Y1Y2  
Corporate 
Governance/CG 
Mechanism  
(X ) 
Earnings 
Management/ML 
(Y1) 
Investment 
Opportunity 
Set/IOS  
(Y2) 
Figure 1. Path Analysis
The path analysis model consists of 2 equa-
tions:
(1) ML = PY1x 1 CG + P Y1Y2 IOS + e 1
(2) IOS = P Y2X1 CG + e 2
Table 1. Definitions of Variable Operations and Measurement of Research Variables
 Variable   Proxy   Measurement   Reference  
Earnings Management: 
accounting policy choice by 
managers in order to achieve 
certain goals (Scott, 2009).  
Discretionary 
accruals  
(DACC)  
Total accruals (TACC) = net income - 
operating cash flow  
Total accruals which are estimated by OLS 
regression  
TACCt / TAT-????????????????????-????????????
-?????????????????-???????????????????-1) 
??????????????? 
Information:  
TAt-1 = total assets in period t-1  
???????????????????????????????? 
?????????????ts receivable change at period t 
 PPEt  = Property, plan, and equipment at 
period t  
ROAt  = Return on assets at period t  
????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
???????????????? ????????will be included in the 
following non-discretionary accrual equation 
and then will be calculated manually to obtain 
a non-discretionary accrual value.  NDACCt = 
???????????-1) ??????????????- ART) / TAT-1) 
????????????????-????????????? 
DACCt = TACCt - NDACCt  
 Kothari  et al.  
(2005)  
  
Corporate Governance: 
system and a set of rules that 
govern the relationship 
among the various parties that 
have interest for corporate 
goals (Zarkasyi, 2008).  
  
Independent 
Commissioner  
  
Percentage of independent commissioners 
compared to the total existing board of 
commissioners  
  
 Abed et al.  (2012)  
  
 Investment Opportunity Set: 
investment decisions in the 
form of a combination 
between owned assets (assets 
in place) and the choice of 
investment (growth options) 
in the future with positive net 
present value (NPV) (Myers, 
1977).  
  
 Market to Book 
Value of Assets 
(MKTBKASS)  
  
 [(Total assets-total equity + (circulating shares 
x closing price)) / total assets]  
  
Adam & Goyal 
(2000), Shanti & 
Yudhanti (2007)  
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RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics provide descriptions of
data viewed from the minimum, maximum, mean,
and standard deviation values. The results of de-
scriptive statistical calculations can be seen in Table
2.
Linearity Test
Linearity test aims to see whether the model
specifications used are correct or not. A good
model should be linear. The linearity test could
be done using Lagrange Multiplier test. If the value
of c2 count (n × R2) < c2 table, it is concluded that
the model is linear (Ghozali, 2005). Linearity test
results can be seen in Table 3.
  N  Minimum  Maximum  Average 
 Standard 
Deviation 
Earnings Management   04   -0.2298  0.1725 0.001463   0.0605458 
Investment Opportunity Set   04   0.8783  2.7964  1.087091  0.2499167 
Corporate Governance   04   0.2857  0.8000  0.577362  0.0917462 
 
  R 2 
 c 2 count 
 (N × R 2) 
 c 2 table  Information 
 Equation 1   0.000   0.000   124.342   Linear  
 Equation 2   0.000   0.000   124.342   Linear  
 
  Du  D  4-du  Information 
Equation 1   1.583  2.001  2.417 No autocorrelation occurs  
 Equation 2   1.562  2.222  2.438 No autocorrelation occurs  
 
 Hypothesis  Direct Effect  Indirect Effect  Hypothesis Description 
 H1   -0.220 *  -   Accepted  
 H 2   0.034  -   Rejected  
 H 3   0.064  -   Rejected  
 H 4   -0.220  0.002   Rejected  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3. Linearity Test Result
Table 4. Autocorrelation Test Result
Table 5. Hypothesis Testing Result
Test Autocorrelation
 Autocorrelation test aims to examine
whether the linear regression model has a corre-
lation between disruption errors in period t with
disruption error in period t-1 (previous). The way
that can be done to detect the presence or absence
of autocorrelation is by conducting Durbin Watson
test. If the value of du <d <4-du, it can be con-
cluded there is no autocorrelation (Ghozali, 2005).
Autocorrelation test result can be seen in table 4.
Hypothesis Testing Result
The result of hypothesis testing is done by
looking at the direct and indirect effects. Table 5
shows the result of the research hypothesis test-
ing.
Note: * Significant at 5%
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DISCUSSION
The Effect of Corporate Governance on
Earnings Management
Based on Table 5, it could be seen that cor-
porate governance had effect on earnings manage-
ment. The direct negative effect value showed that
the better corporate governance would minimize
the occurrence of earnings management.
Based on agency theory, interest conflict
between the agent and the principal occurred be-
cause of the interests differences between agent
and principal. This conflict triggered manager to
do earnings management if the interest of the man-
ager as an agent was different from the interest of
the owner as the principal. A high proportion of
commissioner board is predicted to hamper man-
agement to make discretionary accruals that in-
crease profits (Fanani, 2014). It meant that inde-
pendent commissioners had a negative relation-
ship with earnings management.
The results were consistent with the studies
done by Chen et al. (2007) and Kim & Yoon (2008)
indicating that an independent commissioner might
reduce the likelihood of earnings management.
Independent commissioners had a duty to moni-
tor independently the management performance.
This monitoring was expected that later manager
could not freely work for his personal interests
and they had to prefer the company so that earn-
ings management could also be reduced.
The Effect of Corporate Governance on
Investment Opportunity Set
Independent commissioner as a corporate gov-
ernance mechanism was in charge of running the
monitoring function independently and was ex-
pected to reduce the agency problem. Companies
with a high proportion of independent commis-
sioners would always think about shareholders'
welfare. Therefore, independent commissioners
preferred corporate investment policies that maxi-
mized shareholder wealth.
Based on Table 5, the existence of an inde-
pendent commissioner did not affect the available
investment opportunity set. There were differ-
ences in corporate governance mechanisms for
banking and non-financial companies (Jannati et
al., 2014). From the banking industry point of view,
corporate governance concerned the way in which
business and bank affairs were governed by
boards of directors and senior managers (Moudud-
Ul-Huq, 2014). It meant that the independent com-
missioner did not regulate the business and bank
affairs including in terms of investment opportu-
nity.
The Effect of Investment Opportunity Set on
Earnings Management
In the agency relationship there was asym-
metry of information in which the principal (the
company owner) did not have enough informa-
tion about the performance of the agent (manager).
Managers knew well about the prospects of the
company in the future because managers had more
information and accurate information about the
condition of the company. In the meantime, the
owner could not conduct an optimal supervision
over the manager's performance. It could lead to
earnings management.
 Based on Table 5 it was known that the in-
vestment opportunity set did not affect the earn-
ings management. The result of this study was in
line with the research done by Shanti & Yudhanti
(2007) which indicated that the investment oppor-
tunity set did not affect earnings management.
Companies that had investment opportunity did
not always tend to manage their profits. It was
because of the business competition so that com-
panies avoided the management of profit to gain
investor trust.
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Effect of Corporate Governance on Earnings
Management through Investment
Opportunity Set
According to agency theory, an independent
commissioner would think of the welfare of share-
holders by choosing a low investment policy so
that the company had a lot of funds that could be
shared with shareholders. A low level of invest-
ment meant that the company's projects were also
few. It meant that the level of information asym-
metry of the company was low and the likelihood
of earnings management was also small. However,
low investment could also mean that auditors' su-
pervision became looser and increased the likeli-
hood of earnings management.
 Based on the table 5 it could be seen that
the investment opportunity set could not mediate
the effect of corporate governance on earnings
management. It was because the independent com-
missioner could not regulate the issue of the bank-
ing business for the banking business issue was
governed by director board and senior managers
(Moudud-Ul-Huq, 2014). In addition, because of
the business competition companies avoided do-
ing profit management to gain investors' trust
(Shanti & Yudhanti, 2007).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
This study aimed to examine the effect of
corporate governance on earnings management
with the investment opportunity set as an inter-
vening variable in the banking company in Indo-
nesia. This study tested four hypotheses relating
to the influence of corporate governance on earn-
ings management with the investment opportu-
nity set as an intervening variable in the banking
company in Indonesia.
The results of this study indicate that cor-
porate governance affect earnings management.
The existence of an independent commissioner may
reduce the likelihood of earnings management.
Independent commissioners are asked to do moni-
toring independently on management perfor-
mance. This supervision can reduce the occurrence
of earnings management.
 Corporate governance in this case the inde-
pendent commissioner does not affect the invest-
ment opportunity set. Investment opportunity set
does not affect earnings management and cannot
mediate the effect of corporate governance on
earnings management. It is because the indepen-
dent commissioner cannot regulate the banking
business problem because the banking business
problem is regulated by the board of directors and
senior managers. It means that decisions on in-
vestment opportunities in banking companies are
governed by boards of directors and senior man-
agers. In addition, due to business competition,
the companies avoid doing earnings management
to gain investors' trust.
Suggestion
It is important for companies to know the
factors that lead to earnings management. It is
because the practice of earnings management has
caused some companies in the world fall. Further
researches can use corporate governance mecha-
nisms other than independent commissioners and
use companies other than banking companies.
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